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Abstract
Spending by the UK's National Health Service (NHS)
on independent healthcare treatment has been in-
creased in recent years and is predicted to sustain its
upward trend with the forecast of population growth.
Some have viewed this increase as an attempt not
to expand the patients' choices but to privatize pub-
lic healthcare. This debate poses a social dilemma
whether the NHS should stop cooperating with Pri-
vate providers. This paper contributes to health-
care economic modelling by investigating the evo-
lution of cooperation among three proposed popula-
tions: Public Healthcare Providers, Private Health-
care Providers and Patients. The Patient population is
included as a main player in the decision-making pro-
cess by expanding patient's choices of treatment. We
develop a generic basic model that measures the cost
of healthcare provision based on given parameters,
such as NHS and private healthcare providers' cost
of investments in both sectors, cost of treatments and
gained benefits. A patient's costly punishment is intro-
duced as a mechanism to enhance cooperation among
the three populations. Our findings show that co-
operation can be improved with the introduction of
punishment (patient's punishment) against defecting
providers. Although punishment increases coopera-
tion, it is very costly considering the small improve-
ment in cooperation in comparison to the basic model.
Introduction
The NHS is a free healthcare service at the point of
delivery in the UK funded through taxpayers' contri-
butions (Slawson, 2018). Many public healthcare ser-
vices are currently allocating amounts of their bud-
gets to sourcing services from Independent Health-
care Services Provider (ISP)/private sector. Motivated
by the NHS’s Five Year Forward View (FYFV), we
choose the patient as the core focus of healthcare plan-
ning who is to be included in the decision-making
process (England, 2014; Ham, 2017) for better health,
patient care and financial sustainability. Several sys-
tematic studies looking into the improvement of clin-
ical decision-making find that most patients expect to
be informed about their situation and the treatment
required, and play an important role in their clinical
decision-making. However, little attention has been
given to understanding the patient's role quantitatively
as part of dynamic system modelling.
To investigate the dynamic system interactions
among Public and Private health sectors and Patients,
we resort to an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-
based solution. Researchers have applied EGT in
a wide range of disciplines running the gamut from
economics, politics and security, to ecology, mathe-
matical biology, and computer science (Adami et al.,
2016). EGT allows us to understand and analyze the
complex healthcare system, interactions between in-
dividuals from various populations in a game, and
how strategic behavior might evolve among individ-
uals (Nowak, 2006a; Morgenstern and Von Neumann,
1953).
The main challenges of using EGT lie in formu-
lating a valid payoff matrix and defining the ties be-
tween parameters within the proposed payoff matrix
of each population. Some research on the evolution
of cooperation has focused on the human willingness
to engage in behavior that would involve paying a
cost in return for imposing punishment on defectors or
perceived wrongdoers (Sigmund et al., 2010; Dreber
et al., 2008). Punishment is one mechanism that can
enhance cooperation between individuals caught in
social dilemmas (Hauert et al., 2007). Punishment can
be seen applied in human society, such as by punish-
ing free-riders (Sigmund et al., 2010), and in gover-
nance or institutional systems that impose rewards and
punishments on agents (participants) (Andreoni et al.,
2003). Different types of punishment can be imple-
mented based on the structure of the played game:
peer punishments, pool punishments and institutional
punishments (Sigmund et al., 2010).
In this article, we consider the patient's role when
developing an EGT decision-based model of health-
care services through a tripartite, one-shot EGT game
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Elwyn et al.,
2012). In our proposed model, we measure pa-
tients satisfaction and healthcare providers' reputa-
tion which impact the quality of healthcare services
(Ham, 2017; Robertson et al., 2017). The model is
aimed at identifying dynamic interactions that could
enhance cooperation between the three populations. It
will allow us to ascertain how selecting certain deci-
sions within a dynamic system would influence pa-
tients' satisfaction with the provided service and their
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
07
13
2v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  6
 Ju
l 2
01
9
willingness to cooperate. This could have important
implications for addressing the significant, alarming
drop in public satisfaction with NHS-provided ser-
vices in recent years (Robertson et al., 2017). The so-
cial norm behavior of individuals is analyzed by ap-
plying EGT using one-shot game.
The dynamic of the game is computed through
stochastic selection of strategies based on pa-
tients' satisfaction with received treatments and
providers' reputations. The main question in this ar-
ticle is about how patients influence the dynamics of
their cooperation in an EGT-based framework of three
populations. The main contribution of this article is to
build a basic model for the interactions of the three
populations that closely capture the costs and benefits
of every strategy combining decisions by agents in fi-
nite populations on either cooperation or defection.
We further introduce peer punishment into the model:
the patients' punishment which takes the form of com-
plaints for clinical negligence (Bryden and Storey,
2011; Cooper et al., 2011).
The main contributions are summarized below.
• We develop a simple, yet expressive, basic math-
ematical model to formulate interactions among
the three populations: Patients, Private and Public
health sectors. This is the first dynamical model
that captures the interactions of these populations
in healthcare economic modelling research;
• We develop a mechanism to study the behavior of
individuals in each population and extend the basic
model by introducing punishments in their interac-
tions;
• We analyze the models and examine how the rel-
evant factors would influence cooperation among
individuals within the populations;
• We conduct a comprehensive simulation analy-
sis to determine various types of behavior most-
frequently adopted by individuals based on certain
factors.
Related Work
The rapid development in research on the learning of
social behavior has significantly increased our under-
standing of the dynamic interaction among individ-
uals from different populations (Nowak, 2006a; Sig-
mund et al., 2010). Cooperation is one of the fun-
damental indicators to measure the strength and dy-
namism of a population (Smith, 1974; Kurokawa and
Ihara, 2009; Encarnac¸a˜o et al., 2016). It can be stud-
ied by applying EGT using different types of mech-
anisms, such as reciprocal behaviors, mutual reci-
procity among populations, replication, kin selection
and costly punishment (Nowak, 2006b; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). Researchers seeking to understand
the behavior of different agent representations within
the healthcare system use AI (Anh et al., 2013), game
theory (Brekke and Sørgard, 2007), multi-agent sys-
tems (De and Gelfand, 2017) and big data (Murdoch
and Detsky, 2013) to predict and understand behav-
iors within the system.
(Brekke and Sørgard, 2007) argued that having a
blurred line between the private and public health-
care providers within the NHS might lead to im-
balances in the costs of provided health services
and a drift towards privatisation. While (Wu et al.,
2016) developed their proposed set of various non-
cooperative and cooperative games for the Emergency
Department response based on different types of pa-
tients. Another research investigates different dilem-
mas based on a three-population EGT framework in-
volving the cost for prescribed antibiotics via health-
care providers (Bettinger, 2016). The main limitations
are related to the actual cost paid for prescriptions
and efficiency in quantifying incentives of patients
for selecting the most satisfying or preferred provider.
Another research by Encarnac¸a˜o (Encarnac¸a˜o et al.,
2016) shows that the advent of the civil sector adds
another layer of complexity to a scene that used to be
dominated by two sectors: private and public.
Cooperation level is analysed by frequency-
dependent selection of strategies within the popula-
tions (Kandori et al., 1993; Taylor et al., 2004). In
this context, we seek to show how a drift towards a
cooperate strategy in interactions between the three
populations can be promoted by the adoption of the
most dominant strategy (social behavior) in our pro-
posed model. Based on the stochastic factors and pro-
cesses associated with the healthcare model, this ar-
ticle intends to investigate evolving societal behavior
between patients and different sectors in the health-
care dynamic system. The selection of the patient
population in our model was made for the follow-
ing reasons: finding the best behavior and strategy for
decision-makers among the three populations; deter-
mining the impact of implemented peer punishments
by a patient and how this social mechanism could in-
fluence the decision-making process for better cooper-
ation; and, finding the best strategy for involved pop-
ulations by computing the interaction between private
and public sectors (Cooper et al., 2011; Brekke and
Sørgard, 2007).
A stochastic multi-objective auto-optimisation
model was introduced by Bastian et al. to effectively
manage resource allocation for the military health sys-
tem with an eye to achieving a more efficient funding
and staffing distribution between the Army, Air Force
and Navy (Bastian et al., 2017). Bastian et al.'s re-
search suffers from serious limitations; primarily, that
the model introduced was not generic and depended
on fixed inputs.
The Patient population in our model plays a ma-
jor role (as discussed in the results) in influencing
decision-making. Our analysis significantly improves
our understanding of the model structure and the fac-
Parameters' description Symbol
Reputation benefit for the Public and
Private healthcare providers
bR
Patient's benefit bP
Cost of investment spent by the Pub-
lic/Private healthcare provider
cI
Cost of treatment acquired by the
healthcare provider
cT
Cost of healthcare management cM
Extra Patient's benefit when both
providers cooperate
ε
Strategies Payoffs
P1 P2 P3 Public Private Patient
C C C bR−cI−cT bR−cI−cM bP +εbP
C C D −cI −cI 0
C D C bR−cI−cT 0 bP
C D D −cI 0 0
D C C 0 bR−cI−cM bP − cT
D C D 0 −cI 0
D D C 0 0 −cT
D D D 0 0 0
TABLE 1: The healthcare model (Public healthcare
providers P1, Private healthcare providers P2 and Patient
P3).
tors that lead to cooperation. It helps us answer impor-
tant questions such as: What factors might influence
the patient's rating of the healthcare services? What
factors would induce healthcare providers to seek bet-
ter reputations when the patient derives no or little
benefit from the treatment (e.g. the patient files a com-
plaint for receiving bad healthcare services).
EGT-Based Solutions
Basic Model and Extended Model
Model I - Basic model In this model we consider
three populations: Public providers, Private providers
and consumers/Patients. While Public represents the
NHS or the Public healthcare providers, Private inde-
pendent healthcare providers sell healthcare services,
and Patient represents a person seeking treatment(s).
An individual from each population (Public, Private
and Patient) can choose from two strategies: pro-
vide/accept sustainable treatment(s) identified as co-
operating, otherwise can’t provide/refuse treatment(s)
leading the patient to seek alternative treatment(s)
from other providers. An agent's payoff is acquired
based on the strategy played by each individual from
the three populations, as explained in Table 1.
Every individual or agent in each of the three
populations experiences one of the following sce-
narios based on two strategies, namely, cooperate
(C) and defect (D). This allows us to understand
how cooperation evolves in altruistic interactions
among individuals in a game. The following are the
strategies an individual within each population can
select (refer to Table 1):
FIGURE 1: Evolution dynamics of the simplex's edges rep-
resents three-player actions (Basic model).
Public healthcare providers: 1 (Cooperate, C) of-
fers treatment paid for from taxpayers' money, in
return gets a reputation benefit. (In case of coopera-
tion, the public commits to invest (cI ) from allocated
budget). 2 (Defect, D) does not want to pay for the
treatment.
Private healthcare providers: 1 (Cooperate,
C) offers treatment either paid by Public (when
Public cooperates) or self-paid by Patient (so the
main cost involved is represented by management
cost (cM )), and obtains a reputation benefit (bR). In
case of cooperation with the Patient, Private commits
to invest (cI ) from its revenue. 2 (Defect, D) does
not want to offer the treatment.
Patient: 1 (Cooperate, C) accepts the treatment and
pays for the treatment (cT ) in the Private instance;
Patient obtains health benefit (bP ) if one provider
cooperates and an extra health benefit (εbP ) when
both providers cooperate. 2 (Defect, D) rejects the
treatment and looks for alternative treatment mostly
overseas.
The main issue we investigate in this article is the
spending and cost effectiveness in the healthcare sys-
tem with an eye to elucidating the social dilemma
as mapped in Table 1. The dilemma questions the
probability of cooperation (C) among the two sectors
(Public and Private) and consumers (Patient) result-
ing in sustainable spending and cost effectiveness of
the provision of treatment funded from the taxpay-
ers' money1.
When applying the evolutionary rules as explained
in Fig. 1 on the matrix given in Table 1, the pay-
off is a simple representation of the healthcare cost-
effectiveness, healthcare providers' reputation benefit
and patient's benefit. The eight possible strategic sce-
narios are described below:
• Individuals from all three populations choose to
cooperate, (CCC). In this case, the Public opts to pay
1O'Connell in this https://bit.ly/2VBY4im, article talks
about finding a structural change to reduce NHS spending
and enhance the tendency towards saving.
FIGURE 2: Evolution dynamics of the simplex's edges rep-
resents three-player actions (Extended model with patient's
punishment).
for the treatment provided by the Private sector and
the Patient accepts the provided treatment in pursuit
of her/his own benefit of wellbeing and better health.
The Public bears the costs of investment and pays for
the Patient's treatment (cI+cT ) from its allocated bud-
get. It gains reputation benefits (bR) derived from the
treatment provided by the Private healthcare provider.
Reputation benefits are derived from the Patient's sat-
isfaction with the provided service. On the other hand,
the Private sector will provide the required treatment
to the Patient and receive the payment covering the
costs from the Public. The cost of investment (cI ) of
the Private healthcare provider is to invest in staffing
and healthcare facilities, while (cM ) includes admin-
istrative and operational costs. Consequently, both
the Private and the Public obtain a reputation bene-
fit (bR). Patient obtains extra health benefit (εbP ) as
both healthcare providers are cooperating, where (ε)
captures a fraction of the Patient benefit.
• Both the Private and Public healthcare providers
want to pay and provide treatment to the patient, but
the patient rejects the service (CCD). The payoff in-
dicates that the Public healthcare provider will still
invest (cI ) back in the Public as it is set to cooper-
ate. Similarly, the Private sector only invests (cI ) back
into its own resources, which include staffing, equip-
ment and research, and gets nothing in return. The Pa-
tient's payoff is 0 as no treatment cost was involved;
nor did she/he get health benefits from the services of
the healthcare providers involved.
• The Patient accepts the treatment to be provided
by the Private sector and paid for by the Public but
the Private refuses to provide the treatment (CDC).
The Public's payoff consists of the cost of investment
and treatment (cI + cT ), which are covered from its
allocated budget, and a reputation benefit (bR) is ac-
cumulated based on patients' satisfaction. The cost of
accepting the treatment for the Patient is 0 and s/he
obtains health benefit (bP ).
• The Public is the only party willing to provide
treatment, but the Patient rejects the treatment of-
fered (CDD). So, there is neither treatment cost nor
Parameters' description Symbol
Patient's punishment cost v
Fee paid by punished agent u
Strategies Payoffs
P1 P2 P3 Public Private Patient
C C C bR−cI−cT bR−cI−cM bP + εbP
C C D −cI −cI 0
C D C bR−cI−cT -v bP − u
C D D −cI 0 0
D C C -v bR−cI−cM bP−cT−u
D C D 0 −cI 0
D D C -v -v −cT − 2u
D D D 0 0 0
TABLE 2: The healthcare model with Patient's Punish-
ment (Public healthcare providers P1, Private healthcare
providers P2 and Patient P3).
benefit returned. Hence, the payoff for both the Pri-
vate healthcare provider and the Patient is 0, while
the Public still bears a cost of investment (cI ) in new
treatments (Sapin˜a et al., 2018).
• The Public healthcare provider opts out of provid-
ing treatment and refuses to pay for it; therefore, the
payoff for the Public is 0 (DCC). As the Public does
not want to provide and pay for the Patient's treatment,
the Patient would look for treatment provided by a Pri-
vate sector in a competitive market. The Private sec-
tor's payoff is derived from the gains it makes in its
own reputation benefit (bR); even when it is not coop-
erating with the Public. The payment received goes
towards defraying the costs of investment and man-
agement (cI + cM ). The Patient, on the other hand,
gets health benefits and pays the cost of the treatment
(bP − cT ).
• Only the Private healthcare provider offers to pro-
vide treatment with a specified price tag while neither
the Public wants to pay for the treatment nor the Pa-
tient is accepting the treatment (DCD). The payoff for
the latter two agents is 0, while the transaction in-
volves an investment cost (cI ) to be taken out of the
Private provider's budget.
• None of the healthcare providers is willing to pro-
vide treatments (DDC). This situation leads the Pa-
tient to look for alternative treatments, both domesti-
cally and possibly overseas, and certainly the Patient
has to pay for a treatment cost (cT ).
• The situation depicts all three agents choosing not
to interact with one another (DDD). Hence, there will
be no winner or loser and all agents get a 0 payoff.
Model II- Model with Patient's Punishment This
model extends the basic version by introducing peer
punishment. Patient has the choice to punish defected
healthcare providers after a one-shot game has been
played. Costly punishment means the patient pays a
cost u to force the defecting healthcare provider to pay
a cost of clinical negligence v. The model payoff ma-
trix is provided in Table 2. (Here we assume that, u <
v) (Fowler, 2005).
When an individual from healthcare providers fails
to fulfill their commitment to provide acquired health-
care services up to standards, a patient's punishment
would be meted out to the defecting individual(s)
from healthcare providers v; simultaneously a cost u
is accrued from the patient in this process. Further-
more, if a co-player refuses to commit, the payoff for
both is 0. The transition probability of a mutant play-
ing strategy D to invade a population of C players can
be measured following the method explained below.
Method: Evolutionary Dynamics for Three
Populations
EGT method is adopted to study the evolutionary
dynamics and interactions among individuals from
three distinct finite populations: Public healthcare
providers P1, Private healthcare providers P2 and Pa-
tient P3. Here, we assumed that the populations are
of a fixed size N. Every individual in each population
will be involved in one of the eight strategic scenar-
ios as mentioned earlier. Individuals have the choice
to cooperate, (C) or to defect, (D) in a paradigm shift
fashion. In our proposed model, there are eight possi-
ble paradigms corresponding to the the eight possible
combinations of the basic strategies within the three
populations, namely, CCC, CCD, CDC, CDD, DCC,
DCD, DDC and DDD. Denoting the number of coop-
erators in P1, P2 and P3 by x, y, and z, respectively,
the payoff of each strategy can be written as follows:
PPublics (x, y, z) = Psyz
PPrivates (x, y, z) = Pxsz
PPatients (x, y, z) = Pxys,
 (1)
where x, y, z ∈ {0, 1}, is the payoff for the strategy
selected by individuals from one of the stated popula-
tions, and (x,y,z) represents the selected strategies C or
D. For instance, individuals from P1 have the options
to play C or D. The selected strategy will replace the
s at x vertex, while y and z vertices remain unchanged
for every selected strategy for the Public population
in this instance. The payoff of randomly selected in-
dividuals A and B in the population depends on the
proportion of both players in the population. In each
time step an individual B with fitness piB imitates a
randomly selected individual A with piA fitness adopt-
ing a pairwise comparison rule. The probability ρ that
A adopts B's strategy is given by the Fermi's function
(Sigmund et al., 2010; Traulsen et al., 2007)
ρ = [1 + e−β[piA−piB ]]
−1
(2)
where the parameter β ≥ 0 represents the ‘inten-
sity of selection’or ‘imitation strength’(β = 0 rep-
resents neutral drift where imitation decision is ran-
dom, while for large β → ∞ the imitation deci-
sion is increasingly deterministic). In order to con-
struct a symmetric matrix, the fitness of an individual
FIGURE 3: The plots represent the frequency of all strate-
gies adopted by the populations. Panel (I) represents the fre-
quency of all strategies adopted by the populations based on
the basic model's matrix. Panel (II) examines the frequency
of the model's with punishment strategies for varying (bP
and bR) as stated, where: u = 0.5 and v = 1.5. Other pa-
rameters: cI , cT , cM = 1, bR = 2 and 3, ε = 0.2, N =
100 and β = 0.1.
adopting a strategy s within a population is derived
from the average obtained from the tripartite one-shot
game described in Table 1. The social dynamics of
the three finite populations interacting in eight strate-
gies as a combination of Cs and Ds is represented
by a death-birth process using pairwise comparison
(Traulsen et al., 2006; Nowak, 2006a). Individuals
with the highest payoff reproduce and their social be-
havior is adopted by weak opponents, i.e. the invad-
ing agent. For instance an agent B from the Public
population imitates the successful strategic behaviour,
C, by another regional healthcare provider as agent
A. Subsequently, the transition matrix is evaluated by
values given to the associated parameters as depicted
in Table 1. At each time step, there is a probability of
stochastic selection of an individual from a population
whereby an individual B from one of the populations
playing D with payoff fD may imitate another ran-
domly selected individual A with payoff fC from the
same population. The probability of the occurrence
of this action (Nowak, 2006a; Kandori et al., 1993) is
stated in the equation above. The transition probabil-
ity drifts for agent A playing C from k to k± is given
by:
T±(k) =
k
N
(N − k)
N
[1 + e∓β(ΠC(k)−ΠD(k))]−1 (3)
As mentioned earlier, the process has two absorb-
ing states k = 0 and k = N . In mixed populations,
FIGURE 4: Stationary distribution and fixation probabili-
ties. The parameters’ values are stated for each simplex,
whereas: red arrow represents transition towards defection,
blue arrow transition towards cooperation and dashed line
refers to neutral state. A high fraction 80% of individu-
als would adopt cooperation with lower bP in (II-A) com-
pared to (I-A), whilst an adequate 1% increase in cooper-
ation with higher bR in (II-B) compared to (I-B) is regis-
tered. The transition probability and frequency dependency
are normalised (1/N ), where N = 100. Other parameters:
cI , cT , cM = 1, ε = 0.2 and β = 0.1.
one of the absorbing states at the end would be a pop-
ulation with either all-C or all-D. Determining the dif-
ferent fixation probabilities ρD,C is given by:
ρD,C =
1 + N−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
−1 (4)
The transition matrix Λ with a set of {1, . . . , s} strat-
egy (Encarnac¸a˜o et al., 2016; Nowak, 2006a; Anh
et al., 2013) is:
Λij,j 6=i =
ρji
3
and Λii = 1−
s∑
j=1,j 6=i
Λij (5)
The various fixation probability acquired from ρij is
that a population at a single state i transits to another
state j when a mutant from one of the populations
adopts an s different strategy. In games with large N,
an invader can emerge as the stronger if the condition
below is correct (Sigmund et al., 2010):
N−1∑
i=1
ΠC(k) >
N∑
i=0
ΠD(k) (6)
FIGURE 5: Frequency of strategy CCC for varying the main
parameters bR and bP : (I) for the basic model, (II) extended
model with costly punishment. In (II) u = 0.5 and v = 1.5.
In general, CCC performs better when punishment is in-
troduced to the basic model. Additionally, significant co-
operation is achieved for sufficiently low bR and large bP .
Other parameters cI , cT , cM = 1, ε = 0.2, N = 100, and
β = 0.1.
Results
Pathways to healthcare cooperation
In conducting a numerical and systematic analysis for
the basic model, we focus on the social interactions
between players in each population and how their
decision influences the level of cooperation to sus-
tain cost-effective services and better patient satisfac-
tion. (Fig. 3 I) represents the computation investigat-
ing the frequency of adopting one of the eight strate-
gies in the basic model by analysing the stochastic
behavior of mutation in one of the three populations
based on the frequency for each of the eight strategies
given in (Table 1). That allows us to measure the ul-
timate behavior of those adopting the same strategy
following the rules of social learning (Rendell et al.,
2010).
In the basic model, refer to (Fig. 3 I-A), where bR
is small (bR = 2), the defection strategy DDD is per-
vasive. The players of each of the three populations
spend most of their time adopting defecting strategies
rather than cooperating strategy. By simulating the
matrix implementing (Eqs. 4 and 5) with a selected
range of examined parameters (bP and bR), as stated
in (Fig. 4 I-A), the analysis shows that the DDD strat-
egy dominates the populations’ dynamic by 99%. In
other words, healthcare providers have to invest more
efforts in order to satisfy patients as better cooperation
CCC is achieved when (bR) is sufficiently high.
As it has been observed in the basic model where
punishment is absent, players of each population
spend most of their time at the defecting strategy (see
Fig. 4 I-A). We started by pairwise computation of the
interaction strategies in the payoff matrix (Table 2)
based on different values of the parameters (bR and
bP ) to measure the stationary distribution and the fre-
quency of the eight strategies. Recalling that in our
model the patient has the option to mete out a costly
punishment v to the defecting healthcare provider(s)
at u cost (i.e. legal fees).
FIGURE 6: Robustness of the results across game configurations and parameters of the model with or without punishment
(using 10000 samples). For the basic model: (I) Parameter values: 0.5 ≤ bP ≤ 5, 0.5 ≤ bR ≤ 5. (II) the model with
punishment, where parameter values: 0.5 ≤ bP ≤ 5, 0.5 ≤ bR ≤ 5, 0 ≤ u ≤ 3 and u ≤ v ≤ 10u randomly sampling from
uniform distributions on the intervals. Other parameters: cM , cI , cT = 1 and ε = 0.2, N = 100,
β = 0.1.
Most finite populations drift towards cooperation
(i.e, CCC) as the most dominant strategy. In the pres-
ence of patient's punishment (see Fig. 4 II-A & B),
cooperators invade defectors when there is a large
enough patient's benefit (namely, bP > 1), where the
populations spend at least 79.6% of their time in co-
operation. Our simulation suggests that, regardless of
the reputation's benefit, cooperation is highly achiev-
able (see Fig. 4 II).
Robustness of Parameters
A more compelling analysis has been carried out by
computing 10000 samples with the set of parameters
stated in (Fig. 6) to obtain the stationary distribution
of cooperation for both the basic model and the ex-
tended model. Considering the collected results in the
plot for the basic model in (Fig. 4), it is noticeable that
the mean outcomes in (Fig. 6 I&II) are approximate.
Discussion and Conclusions
In summary, this paper investigates the behavior of individ-
uals within the three finite populations to achieve better co-
operation. By analyzing the performance of each popula-
tion and its preferred path towards evolving and adopting a
new strategy, we explored how to move towards cooperation
while taking into consideration the cost of effectiveness and
patient satisfaction with the provided services. Basically, the
cooperation rules of each of the model's dynamics explained
in (Fig. 1 & 2) clearly show that there are some paths mov-
ing toward full cooperation (see the panels in Fig. 1).
In contrast, avoiding the enveloped state (where some
critics alluded to great fear of collaboration with private
healthcare providers as ‘the beast of the (P-Privatisation)’)
is represented by the DDD node; the public sector repre-
sents the main agent that can take the lead in changing the
rules and influence the behavior of the private sector and pa-
tient by introducing new policies. For different values of bR
and bP , the frequency of strategy CCC has improved in the
extended model (as apposed to the basic model), (see Fig. 5
A & B).
Moreover, the initial result yielded by the basic model
is generally moving towards defection, apart from cases
where a considerably high reputation value is imposed on
the computation process, in which case there is a drift to-
wards defection. In comparison, the results obtained when
patient’s costly punishment is introduced for the populations
show a heightened tendency towards cooperation. This re-
quires not only high patient's satisfaction but also a high
reputation gained by healthcare providers; however, a full
cooperation can be achieved within the basic framework
on considerably low patient’s satisfaction. In this case,
the imposed peer punishment enhances cooperation with
low patient's satisfaction, but it is proved too costly to be
adopted in the proposed healthcare model. Realistic scenar-
ios could be derived from some elective treatments such as
hip replacements (Moscelli et al., 2016). In fact, data col-
lected by the NHS and Care Quality Commission (CQC)
(CQC, 2019), and The Patient Reports Outcome Measures
(PROMs) (NHSDigital, 2019) are well represented in our
proposed model in addition to some NHS statistics that sub-
stitutes for the cost of treatment and expenditures. We do
recognise that our proposed models have some limitations,
such as that our models are not validated against real health-
care data (it will be considered in future work) and the lack
of comparison with other techniques. In this work, we only
focus on analysing the behavior between agents using basic
factors.
Future work will involve investigating the implementation
of institutional punishment, expanding the model (i.e., by
introducing new factors) to study the relation between the
new elements and the dynamic behaviour of individuals. Fi-
nally, our proposed model directs attention to how the pa-
tient’s decision would impact the process of collaboration
between healthcare providers, and to the effectiveness of
management decisions made by the private sector in influ-
encing the patient's choice of cooperation.
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